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Abstract: This paper deals with the question whether low- and middle-income countries that 
are politically better integrated into the international system are able to provide higher levels 
of environmental quality than could be expected only according to their national income 
levels. Using time-series cross-section regression analysis of 110 countries for the period 
1950-1999 it can be shown that those countries that have signed and ratified more 
environmental treaties, have significantly lower SO2 emissions than countries that are less 
integrated into the international system. However, in contrast to theoretical predictions 
democratic low- and middle-income countries despite their stronger integration into the 
international system exhibit higher SO2 emissions indicating lower environmental quality than 
autocratic countries.   2 
1. Introduction 
When a country’s economy is growing, environmental pollution usually tends to increase as 
well. The theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between income and 
pollution shows that most pollutants like SO2, heavy particles, smoke, etc. rise monotonically 
with growing income until a country reaches a certain threshold whereupon pollution often 
starts to decline. This inverted U-shaped relationship is called the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (Grossman and Krueger 1995). Although most industrialized countries have already 
passed this threshold and have declining pollution this is not the case for most low- and 
middle-income countries. Consequently, the question arises as to whether those countries 
have to grow rich before giving attention to the provision of environmental quality or whether 
there exist other channels through which the provision of environmental quality could be 
attained also by low- and middle-income countries. This paper examines the possibility that 
due to increasing international political integration, low- and middle-income countries are 
able to provide better environmental quality than should be expected according to their 
national income level. Furthermore, it is assessed whether democratic low- and middle-
income countries are better integrated into the international system and thus achieve through 
this better integration a higher provision of environmental quality.  
 
This paper intends to analyze how the political system and the degree of international 
integration alter the provision of environmental quality with regard to low- and middle-
income countries. It further tends to capture the interaction between these two factors leading 
to a more comprehensive analysis of the question how low- and middle-income countries can 
be enabled to provide better environmental quality. Figure 1 displays the key factors of this 
study. Using a time-series cross-section regression analysis it can be shown that higher levels 
of international political integration, measured by the number of environmental treaties a 
country has ratified, significantly increase the level of environmental quality in a particular 
country. In contrast, the influence of the political system is contrary to expectations. Although 
democratic low- and middle- income countries sign and ratify more international 
environmental treaties the net effect of democracy on the provision of environmental quality 
is negative. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
   3 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section reviews the state of 
research and develops a theoretical framework from which testable hypothesis are derived. 
Thereafter, the research design is outlined and the operationalization and measurement of the 
dependent and independent variables of the analysis are specified. The paper concludes with 
the discussion of the results and a summary. 
 
2. Literature review and theoretical framework 
2.1 National income and environmental quality 
The starting point of the theoretical framework underlying this paper is the literature on the 
relationship between national income and environmental quality. Different studies like Shafik 
and Bandyopadhyay (1992), Selden and Song (1994) and Grossman and Krueger (1995) 
empirically found an inverted U-shaped relationship between growing GDP per capita and 
several indicators of environmental pollution such as SO2, heavy particles, smoke and water 
pollutants and labeled this relationship Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC).  
 
According to Grossman and Krueger (1995) the effect of increasing GDP per capita on 
environmental quality can be decomposed into a scale, composition and technology effect. 
Rising industrial production would lead to monotonically rising pollution all else being equal. 
This is called the scale effect as pollution increases with the scale of the economy. However, 
as the economy grows the composition of the industry usually changes from manufacturing 
and agricultural oriented industries towards a more service-oriented industry
1. This 
composition effect usually leads to a decrease in pollution. Finally, the development of the 
economy additionally leads to technological improvements, which are supposed to also 
reduce pollution. This can work either the way that the same amount of output can be 
produced by a smaller amount of input or due to filter systems or other abatement technology 
the same amount of input produces a smaller amount of pollution. On the basis of this 
division into scale, composition and technology effects Grossman and Krueger (1995) explain 
the inverted U-shape of the EKC as follows: first with rising income due to the scale effect 
pollution is increasing. After a certain level composition and technology effect are growing in 
importance and when they surpass the scale effect pollution is decreasing
2. 
                                                 
1 This is only true for an economy, which changes from a predominantly manufacturing industry towards a more 
service-oriented industry. If an economy with a strong agricultural sector, as it is the case for most low-income 
countries, increases its manufacturing sector pollution is more likely to rise. 
2 It is important to note that the EKC only constitutes a theoretically stylized explanation for the relationship 
between national income and environmental quality. Consequently, countries might empirically deviate from this   4 
 
Additionally, Selden and Song (1994) and Grossman and Krueger (1995) point to a political 
component to the relationship between environmental pollution and growing income levels. 
At the stage of early economic development environmental quality is considered a luxury 
good by most people in a particular country. As states have only limited resources available 
environmental quality ranks far behind the demand for increasing economic conditions and 
living standards. Only after they attend a certain level of living standard environmental 
quality turns into a normal public good and people demand that a government takes actions to 
reduce or avoid pollution, for example by enacting appropriate environmental regulations. 
Grossman and Krueger (1995) subsume this mechanism under the concept of the 
technological effect, introduced in the above paragraph, and call it “induced technological 
change”. They assume that “the strongest link between income and pollution in fact is via an 
induced policy response” (Grossman and Krueger 1995: 372). In the same line, Selden and 
Song (1994: 147) consider “increasing levels of education and environmental awareness” as 
well as a “more open political systems” as decisive factors explaining the relationship 
between income growth and environmental quality besides the “positive income elasticity for 
environmental quality” and “changes in the composition of production and consumption”. 
Consequently, “the development trajectory for pollution is likely to reflect both market forces 
and changes in government regulation” (Selden and Song 1994: 147).  
 
From all this follows that according to the logic underlying the EKC, most low- and middle-
income countries are still on the upward part of the curve and are likely to face increasing 
pollution levels as the manufacturing part of their industry is still increasing and their 
technological level has not yet reached high standards. Furthermore, according to the political 
explanation of the EKC most low- and middle-income countries in many cases are also 
expected to lack the means and most likely also the interest to provide better environmental 
quality.  
 
First of all, they lack the means to provide better environmental quality as usually low- and 
middle-income countries have only very limited resources available to spend on public goods. 
It can be expected that these limited resources are firstly allocated to the most pressing needs 
of those countries, i.e. to actions that raise the economic conditions and therefore the living 
standards within a particular country. In addition, due to the low technological levels of most 
                                                                                                                                                       
U-shaped relationship. Furthermore, the inverted U-shape relationship is not un-debated in the literature see 
Stern (2004), who argues that the EKC needs very careful interpretation.   5 
low- and middle-income countries, their governments often lack the capacities to provide 
environmental quality. This is because information and knowledge on environmental 
problems are missing, the technology to abate pollution is not available and often the 
institutional capacities are low so that clear and binding regulations are absent or cannot be 
enforced (Hettige et al. 1996).  
 
Secondly, for most low- and middle-income countries environmental quality is not of first 
interest and so it does not constitute a very important objective to spend resources on. As 
outlined above, it is assumed that people usually do not demand better environmental quality 
until their living standards reach a certain threshold. Hence, environmental quality is 
considered a luxury good until a certain level of economic development is reached. “This 
need not imply that poor countries care less about the environment per se. Rather, because of 
their poverty, they might prioritize issues other than the environment” (Neumayer 2002: 150). 
Consequently, the top priority of most governments in low- and middle-income countries 
does not consist in the provision of environmental quality but rather in economic growth for 
example. In addition, these countries do not only spend little or no extra means on 
environmental quality they are also unlikely to enforce environmental regulations. On the one 
hand, environmental regulations often imply an increase in the prize of production, which 
would thus hurt economic growth. As Boyce (2002: 25) argues “people cannot be expected to 
cease activities that degrade the environment yet are essential to the sustenance of their 
families”. On the other hand, in order to enforce and monitor environmental regulations 
public authority and administration is needed. However, the functioning and maintenance of 
public authorities with the aim of enforcing environmental regulations also presupposes 
resources in the form of institutional capacities, e.g. trained personnel, and money to maintain 
these institutions. As resources are however limited in most low and middle-income countries, 
the enforcement of environmental regulations is rendered unlikely.  
 
In summary, it can be concluded that most low- and middle-income countries should not or 
only to a very limited extent provide better environmental quality due to the following 
reasons. On the one hand, according to the EKC these countries are generally situated on the 
upward part of the curve as pollution is assumed to grow with raising income levels while at 
the same time their technological levels are likely to be rather low. On the other hand, most 
low- and middle-income countries are assumed to lack the means and the interest to spend 
resources on environmental quality. Moreover, at this level of economic development the type   6 
of the political system (democracy or autocracy) per se should not play a decisive role as the 
median voter in low- and middle-income countries should not demand environmental quality 
due to the reasons outlined above and thus a democratic government has not to respond to it. 
 
A possible consequence one could draw at this point would be that low- and middle-income 
countries have to grow rich before they will be able to clean up. However, this consequence 
ignores other possible influence channels that may alter those countries’ ability to provide 
better environmental quality. One such channel could be a country’s international political 
integration and its interaction with a country’s political system. Up to this point, only national 
factors have been examined as being decisive for the provision of better environmental 
quality. However states do not act in a vacuum, they are influenced by other states, by 
economic pressures and dependencies and international actors. Consequently, it has been 
argued that international integration also influences the capacity and interest of states to 
provide environmental quality (Antweiler et al. 2001; Frankel and Rose 2005; Neumayer 
2002; Ward 2006). However, the mechanisms how international integration is supposed to 
affect a country’s ability to provide environmental quality might also depend on the political 
system of the particular country. The extent of its international integration and thus the 
provision of environmental quality might depend on the fact whether the country is 
democratic or not. The next sections specify the mechanisms how international political 
integration and its interaction with a country’s political system could influence the provision 
of environmental quality. In terms of clarity of the argument firstly the impact of international 
political integration on environmental quality is analyzed and then the interaction with the 
political system is incorporated. 
 
2.2 International political integration and environmental quality 
Although states are sovereign actors they often cooperate together on the international level 
through regimes, treaties and through membership in international organizations. This is also 
true for the field of environmental protection: there exist for example a tremendous number of 
treaties dealing among other things with air or water pollution, with trade in toxic waste or 
endangered species etc. The concept of international political integration as understood in this 
paper hence encompasses a country’s membership in international regimes that deal with 
environmental purposes.  
   7 
The perhaps most prominent definition of international regimes describes them as “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983: 3). 
However this definition causes several difficulties for empirical research as it covers a wide 
range of international agreements including non-explicit or non-formalized agreements, which 
are difficult to identify and measure (Tooze 1990; Porter et al. 2000). Consequently, my 
analysis relies on a more narrow definition of regimes as “multilateral agreements among 
states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue area“ (Haggard and Simmons 
1987: 495). According to this definition regimes are formalized forms of international 
cooperation implying that international cooperation could also take place outside the scope of 
regimes.  
 
The general purpose of regimes
 is to enable or facilitate cooperation at the international level 
and thereby to enable countries to solve problems, which they often are unable to solve 
independently, and hence to realize benefits from international cooperation (Keohane 1984). 
Regimes can enable cooperation between states by reducing transaction costs, by limiting 
uncertainty, by widening the shadow of the future, by increasing reputational costs or by 
allowing credible commitments (Keohane 1984; Abbott and Snidal 1998; 2000). However, 
the benefits of cooperating at the international level come with certain costs, such as a loss in 
sovereignty as international regimes constrain governments’ autonomy over decision-making. 
Furthermore, regimes entail costs as governments have to spend resources for negotiating, 
ratifying and for complying with the particular regime (Abbott and Snidal 2000). Following a 
rational choice perspective, membership in a particular international regime is therefore only 
rational for a country if the benefits of cooperation outweigh its costs (Moravcsik 2000). 
Consequently, low and middle-income countries should only join a particular environmental 
regime if the cost-benefit calculation of joining results in an incentive to do so. This however 
implies that by joining a particular regime, a country’s government in order to enjoy the 
benefits from cooperation in principle accepts that the regime at question sets limits or 
influences the country’s actions in this issue area. 
 
Membership in international regimes is supposed to influence the behavior of a particular 
country due to several reasons. First and most important, members of a particular regime 
should obey the corresponding rules. For instance, in the case of the Montreal Protocol, which 
was designed to reduce chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) emissions, member countries should stop   8 
emitting ozone-depleting substances. Therefore, formalized regimes promote cooperation as 
they raise the reputational stakes for reneging on agreements and enhance the legal liabilities 
(Keohane 1984). Thus, for example emitting ozone-depleting substances while being a 
member of a treaty, which bans these substances, has negative consequences for the 
reputation of this country. In addition, according to the particular treaty non-compliance could 
even be sanctioned meaning that the organization responsible for the treaty can demand from 
the particular country to enforce the treaty rules
3. Taking these two arguments together this 
implies that by deciding to join a particular regime a country binds itself to its rules and thus 
is supposed to implement and follow them. 
 
Furthermore, international regimes create norms on good behavior or rather what constitutes 
bad conduct (Ward 2006). Thus, for example due to the Montreal Protocol the emission of 
CFCs is negatively stigmatized. Abbot and Snidal (2000: 425) subsume these possibilities 
under “techniques ranging from litigation and sanctions to persuasion, normative appeals, and 
shaming”. International regimes also allow for information transfer, which is especially 
important for low and middle-income countries. Due to new information and knowledge on 
environmental pollution, awareness of environmental quality as an important public good 
could be created or knowledge on abatement possibilities could be distributed (Porter et al. 
2000). From all this follows that in general membership in international regimes, treaties and 
organizations is expected to positively influence the ability of low and middle-income 
countries to provide environmental quality. Consequently, my first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: Low- and middle-income countries that are members in more environmental regimes 
provide higher levels of environmental quality. 
 
This first hypothesis states a general relationship between membership in international 
regimes and environmental quality. However, as mentioned above this relationship could also 
depend on the political system of a country. Consequently, the next section analyzes the 
interaction between international political integration and its political system with regard to 
the provision of environmental quality.  
 
                                                 
3 Although the individual influence of a particular regime will vary according to its exact institutional design – 
e.g. a regime with a strong institutional foundation (secretariat, enforcement mechanisms etc), a higher degree of 
independence and which is supported by a major power should be more influential (Boehmer et al. 2004) – the 
general influence of regimes is supposed to be positive independent of its institutional design.   9 
2.3. Interconnection with the political system 
Until now the analysis has treated all countries equally and hence has neglected the role of the 
political system of a particular country. However, it can be argued that countries with 
different types of political systems also vary with regard to the extent of their international 
integration and their ability to provide environmental quality. Hence, the political system 
could affect the ability of a country to provide environmental quality, as the intensity of its 
international political integration is likely to be dependent on the political system of the 
particular country. Consequently, it is argued in this section that democratic countries are 
integrated in the international system to a greater extent than their autocratic counterparts 
implying that democratic countries should be members in more international treaties. 
Therefore, following from the overall positive influence of international integration on the 
provision of environmental quality, established in the preceding section, I argue that it follows 
that democratic countries will because of their higher levels of international integration also 
provide better environmental quality. 
 
The reasons why it is argued that democratic countries are stronger integrated at the 
international level are the following. First, citizens in democracies in contrast to citizens in 
autocratic countries are able to express their preferences and to put pressure on their 
governments to behave according to these preferences (Neumayer et al. 2002). With regard to 
the environment, people in democratic countries can thus articulate their interest and also 
have the possibility to demand that their government acts accordingly, for example by joining 
international treaties (Payne 1995). In addition, Neumayer et al. (2002) argue that in 
democracies environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGO) and other actors are 
able to lobby for environmental purposes. They can thus influence both the public and the 
government by campaigns or other forms of information provision in order to reach more 
cooperation with regard to environmental problems
4. This argument is supported by 
Neumayer (2002a) who can show that citizens of democratic states receive more information 
on environmental pollution than citizens of autocratic states.  
 
Second, democratic countries tend to be more transparent than autocracies and therefore they 
can more easily and credibly commit themselves to international cooperation (Remmer 1998; 
Gaubatz 1996). Similarly, Abbott and Snidal (2000) argue that strong domestic legal 
                                                 
4 However, it has to be stated that the same argument does also apply to other actors like business groups, which 
could lobby and try to influence the government in opposite ways than environmental groups.   10 
institutions and traditions should increase international credibility. Hence democracies as they 
usually have stronger legal institutions should more easily commit themselves and thus can be 
expected to cooperate more often on the international level. Third, it can be derived from the 
literature on the democratic peace theorem that democracies tend to cooperate more on the 
international level than autocratic countries. This is because democracies are supposed to be 
used to solve their domestic conflicts by cooperation and accordingly they are assumed to 
project their cooperative behavior also to the international realm (Russett et al. 1999; Russett 
and Oneal 2001). Altogether, the argument that democracies display more international 
environmental commitment is empirically supported by Roberts et al. (2004), Fredriksson and 
Gaston (2000) as well as Neumayer (2002a; 2002b) who show that democracies not only tend 
to ratify more international environmental agreements but that democracies are also faster in 
ratifying these agreements. 
 
Altogether these arguments imply that on average democracies should be better integrated 
into the international system than autocratic countries meaning that they should join more 
international regimes than autocracies. In the section before it has been argued that countries, 
which have joined more environmental regimes, are expected to provide higher levels of 
environmental quality. Combining these two arguments leads to the expectation that 
democracies due to their better international integration should provide higher levels of 
environmental quality. This is the basis of my second hypothesis. 
 
H2: Democratic low and middle-income countries are supposed due to their higher levels of 
political integration to provide better environmental quality than autocratic low and middle-
income countries. 
 
This proposition is further supported by the empirical literature dealing with the relationship 
between the political system and the provision of public goods (Barrett and Graddy 2000; 
Bernauer and Koubi 2006; Deacon 1999; Deacon 2003; Torras and Boyce 1998). This 
literature shows that in general democracies tend to be better providers of environmental 
quality
5. The underlying theoretical argument, why democracies should provide more public 
                                                 
5  However there also exist empirical studies in which democratic political systems are related to worse 
environmental quality (Midlarsky 1998). These findings are backed by the argument that autocracies might 
supply more public goods as usually their leaders have a longer planning horizon. As most environmental 
problems develop slowly and often become apparent only in the distant future, democratic leaders who might be   11 
goods to their population than autocracies, goes as follows (Deacon 1999; Deacon 2003; 
McGuire and Olson 1996; Olson 1993): In an autocracy there is mostly a small elite in power 
and this elite tries to extract as much resources for personal wealth out of the respective 
country as possible. Therefore, if the provision of a particular good requires that the costs are 
largely borne by the elite, and the benefits however are enjoyable by everyone, it is unlikely 
that this particular good will be provided. In the case of environmental quality it can be 
argued that as the costs of the provision are to a great extent borne by the industry, which has 
to regulate its pollution intensity, the ruling elite will face the main costs, as they are most 
likely the ones in charge of the main industrial activities. However, as the benefits of clean air 
or water are enjoyed by all citizens, environmental quality is likely to be underprovided in 
autocracies. In contrast, in democratic countries governments seeking (re)-election are more 
likely to provide public goods to their citizens in order to convince the median-voter to (re)-
elect the party in power.  
 
In summary, the theoretical part of this paper postulates that due to increasing international 
political integration, low and middle-income countries are able to provide better 
environmental quality than could be expected according to their national income level. 
Furthermore, it is argued that democratic low and middle-income countries are better 
integrated into the international system and are thus able to provide higher levels of 
environmental quality than their autocratic counterparts. 
 
3. Research Design 
In order to test the above made theoretical arguments, this paper pursues a quantitative 
statistical approach in the form of a time-series cross-section analysis. The sample consists of 
all low and middle-income countries, for which data was available. According to the World 
Bank a country is classified as a low- or middle-income country if it has a national income 
level below 3,465 US Dollars per capita. In general, the time span of the analysis is limited 
due to the availability of data on environmental quality to the period of 1950-1999. However, 
depending on the country the data availability varies considerably leading to an unbalanced 
                                                                                                                                                       
more myopic as they face frequently re-elections might not be interested in facing the short-term costs of 
providing long-term environmental quality (Congleton 1992; Midlarsky 1998). In addition, some studies claim 
that in mature democracies public goods are underprovided because special interest groups gained a 
disproportionate influence on the government. Therefore governments often provide private goods to these 
interest groups instead of providing public goods to the whole population (Midlarsky 1998; Olson 1982).    12 
panel structure. Altogether, the sample encompasses 110 countries leading to 3036 
observations in total. 
 
Concerning the operationalization of the different theoretical concepts it firstly has to be 
decided how to measure the dependent variable of my analysis, namely environmental 
quality. In the literature different measures of environmental quality are employed (Bernauer 
and Koubi 2006; Ward 2006; De Soysa and Neumayer 2005; Neumayer 2003; Sigman 2002; 
Grossman and Krueger 1995). In line with Bernauer and Koubi (2006) and Grossman and 
Krueger (1995) I decided to use SO2 as a measure of environmental quality as it has several 
advantages compared to other measures. Firstly, in contrast to water pollution SO2 is not only 
of importance to the region surrounding the particular river or lake but rather to the whole 
population of a country, as high levels of SO2 constitute great risk for the health of all citizens 
within this country. Furthermore, in contrast to for example CO2 abatement technology is 
easily available. This means SO2 emissions are reducible however only at a certain cost, 
which implies that in order to reduce emission levels the willingness to do so is a prerequisite. 
Finally, data availability is more comprehensive for SO2 as compared to other air pollutants 
such as fine particulate matter or as compared to combined indices such as the concept of 
national footprint or genuine savings. 
 
The first independent variable of the analysis – membership in international regimes – is 
operationalized by employing a yearly count of each country’s membership in environmental 
regimes. The data on membership stems from the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University
6. With this data it is possible to 
distinguish between the treaties a country has only signed and those treaties, which a country 
has ratified. Consequently, two variables were created, cumulated ratification, which 
measures how many treaties the particular country has ratified up to this year and cumulated 
signatures, which measures accordingly how many treaties this country has signed up to this 
year. This distinction between ratification and signature should be important as a country 
commits itself to a greater extent when ratifying a treaty than by only signing it. The second 
independent variable is the political system of a country, which is measured using the 
combined democracy and autocracy score of the POLITY IV dataset, which ranges from -10 
(most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). In order to capture the interconnection between a 
                                                 
6 http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/   13 
country’s political system and its international integration, the political system variable is 
incorporated as an interaction term together with the variables measuring political integration. 
 
As outlined in the theoretical section, according to the Environmental Kuznets Curve there 
exists a strong effect of a countries national income level on its environmental quality. In 
order to capture the inverted U-shaped relationship postulated by the EKC, GDP per capita as 
well as its square term are included in the regression model as control variables. Finally, a 
time trend is incorporated to capture time effects. Combining all different variables this leads 
to the following regression model: 
 
SO2it = 0  +  1  * international political integration + 2  * political system +   
3 * interaction term + 4 * GDP per capita + 5 * GDP
2 + 6 * time trend + e 
 
where SO2 is the log of the SO2 emissions in country i at time t, 1 – 6  are coefficients, and e 
is the error term. All regression models are estimated using fixed effects. This is indicated as 
the Hausman test reveals a systematic difference between the estimations using fixed and 
those using random effects. In addition, the use of fixed effects is appropriate, as the data in 
the sample is not randomly drawn from a larger population.  
 
4. Results 
Does ratification or signing of environmental treaties actually influence environmental quality 
in low- and middle-income countries? Table 1 shows the results using a fixed effects 
regression model with cumulated number of ratifications as the main independent variable. 
The results show that the number of ratified treaties has a strong and statistically significant 
negative effect on the yearly SO2 emissions of a country. Hence, as postulated in hypothesis 
one the more environmental treaties a country has ratified the higher its level of 
environmental quality measured by its SO2 emissions. Both GDP and its square term show the 
signs expected according to the inverted U-shape of the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
however only GDP per capita is significant. This can probably be explained by the fact that 
for most countries in the sample the scale effect might still dominate the composition and 
technology effect meaning that an increase in income implies an increase in production, 
which then leads to an increase in pollution. Consequently, in this sample only a linear 
positive effect of national income on SO2 pollution can be detected. 
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(Table 1 about here) 
 
The same picture as in table 1 arises if cumulated signatures are incorporated into the 
regression model instead of cumulated ratifications. The results in table 2 do not differ except 
that the coefficient for cumulated signatures is even higher as the coefficient for the 
ratifications. This is somewhat surprising as it could be expected that a country takes those 
treaties more seriously which it has ratified than those treaties it has only signed as ratification 
constitutes a stronger commitment. Altogether, the results in table 2 also speak in favor of 
hypothesis one, which gives confidence in the result that those low- and middle-income 
countries, which are member to more international environmental regimes and thus are 
politically better integrated into the international system, also show higher levels of 
environmental quality. 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
In a second step, two further independent variables are integrated into the regression model, a 
country’s polity score and its interaction with a country’s international political integration, in 
order to evaluate hypothesis two. The results, which are displayed in table 3, show no 
deviations for the variables, which have already been incorporated in the regression models 
above. The interaction term is negative and statistically significant implying that countries, 
which have ratified more environmental treaties and having a higher polity score, have lower 
SO2 emission indicating higher levels of environmental quality. However, in contrast to the 
predictions of hypothesis two the net effect of a democratic political system on SO2 emissions 
is positive indicating lower levels of environmental quality. This clearly speaks against 
hypothesis two, which states that democratic low- and middle-income countries are expected 
due to their higher levels of international integration to provide better environmental quality 
than their autocratic counterparts. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
In order to check whether the result with regard to the positive net effect of the political 
system on SO2 emissions really implies that democratic low- and middle-incomes exhibit 
lower environmental quality or if it is rather due to the fact that the assumption does not hold 
that these countries are better integrated into the international system, I explicitly try to test   15 
this assumption. Therefore, a fixed effects regression model is calculated using the yearly 
number of ratified treaties per country as the dependent variable. The results in table 4 
however clearly support the assumption that democratic low- and middle-income countries 
are better integrated into the international system. The coefficient of the political system 
variable is positive and highly significant indicating that the more democratic a country is, the 
more environmental treaties it has ratified. From this follows that the results in table 3 are not 
driven by this assumption but rather it implies that although democratic low- and middle-
income countries are better integrated into the international system the net effect of a 
democratic political system on a country’s environmental quality is negative. A result that 
definitely requires further attention and research. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
Additionally, the results in table 4 reveal another interesting insight. In contrast to the inverted 
U-shape of the Environmental Kuznets Curve national income exerts a U-shaped influence on 
environmental treaty ratification. This implies that countries with very low GDP per capita as 
well as middle-income countries tend to ratify more environmental treaties than countries 
with GDP levels in between these two extremes. This could probably be due to the fact that 
for those countries in between the two extremes the economy and thus the manufacturing 
sector is starting to grow which results in increasing GDP per capita. However, if the 
manufacturing sector is starting to develop it might be very costly to enforce environmental 
standards or regulations and hence these countries have no strong incentives to join 
international environmental agreements.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Do low and middle-income countries have to grow rich until they are able to provide 
environmental quality? This paper intended to evaluate whether low and middle-income 
countries, which are politically more integrated into the international system, are able to 
provide better environmental quality than could be expected according to their national 
income levels. Furthermore, it was assessed whether the political system of low and middle-
income countries plays a decisive role concerning the provision of environmental quality. It 
was hypothesized that democratic countries are better integrated into the international system 
and due to this stronger integration they were assumed to provide higher levels of   16 
environmental quality. In order to test these theoretical arguments a time-series cross-section 
regression approach was chosen. 
 
Altogether the results can only partly support the theoretical propositions of this paper. In 
contrast to expectations, democratic low- and middle-income countries although they are 
better integrated into the international system do not provide higher levels of environmental 
quality but rather have significantly higher SO2 emissions. However, the results yield strong 
support for the major hypothesis of this paper: low- and middle-income countries which are 
better integrated into the international system – measured by the number of environmental 
treaties a country has ratified – have significantly lower SO2 emissions indicating that they are 
better providers of environmental quality. Consequently, it seems that strong international 
integration can at least partially compensate the negative influence of growing national 
income with regard to low- and middle-income countries. Hence, these countries can provide 
better environmental quality even before growing rich. 
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Table 1: Fixed effects regression model: SO2 emissions (cumulated ratifications) 
 
GDP per capita  0.001 
(0.000)*** 
GDP
2  -0.000 
(0.000) 
Cumulated ratification  -0.024 
(0.005)*** 
Time trend  0.049 
(0.002)*** 
Constant  -94.539 
(4.774)*** 
Observations  3178 
Number of countries  110 
R-squared  0.36 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  





Table 2: Fixed effects regression model: SO2 emissions (cumulated signatures) 
 
GDP per capita  0.001 
(0.000)*** 
GDP
2  -0.000 
(0.000) 
Cumulated signing  -0.029 
(0.005)*** 
Time trend  0.058 
(0.003)*** 
Constant  -113.463 
(6.238)*** 
Observations  3178 
Number of countries  110 
R-squared  0.37 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Fixed effects regression model: SO2 emissions (interaction with the political system) 
 
GDP per capita  0.001 
(0.000)*** 
GDP
2  -0.000 
(0.000) 
Polity score  0.020 
(0.005)*** 




Time trend  0.047 
(0.003)*** 
Constant  -91.53 
(4.993)*** 
Observations  3039 
Number of countries  105 
R-squared  0.36 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  






Table 4: Fixed effects regression model: treaty ratification 
 
GDP per capita  -0.003 
(0.000)*** 
GDP
2  0.000 
(0.000)*** 
Political System  0.063 
(0.012)*** 
Time trend  0.374 
(0.005)*** 
Constant  -730.971 
(9.009)*** 
Observations  3188 
Number of countries  110 
R-squared  0.76 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
 
   23 





















Congo, Dem. Rep. 



















































Sierra Leone  
Somalia  












Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
Zambia  
Zimbabwe  
 